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Abstract 
A representative survey of about 2,000 citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany was conducted 
in NovemberjDecember 1986, seven months after the Chemobyl accident, to analyze the impacts 
ofthat event on the behavior, opinions and attitudes of the German public. 
It was found that one major response to the event is uncertainty about the health consequences 
of the reactor accident. About 50 % of the interviewed people report changes in the nutritial 
habits of both themselves and their children. The changes in the diet, made according to 
recommendations made by several govemmental authorities and other organizations and groups, 
vary strongly with the degree of education. The reasons for this are due, first, to a greater Oppo-
sition to nuclear energy in general and, second, to a quicker and more consequent transformation 
of opinions and attitudes into behavioral dispositions within the more educated groups. 
About 40 % of the respondents voted in favour of an accelerated withdrawal from nuclear energy 
by shutdown of existing nuclear power plants and not just by the prohibition of new ones. It is 
interesting to notice that not the youngest respondents are most frequently against nuclear energy 
but rather the 25-30 year-old age group. 
Two major surprises were found when analyzing which information sources the respondents 
trusted: First, trust in established institutions like Govemment, N uclear Research Centres and 
Nuclear Industry is hardly higher than that in institutions opposing the "establishment" like the 
Öko-Institute (a so-called "alternative" research establishment), citizens' interest groups and jour-
nalists. (The latter belanging to the duster of anti-established institutions to a somewhat lower 
degree.) Second, trust in the establishment is only very slightly negatively correlated with trust in 
the anti-establishment. About a quarter of the population trusts both sides, the establishment as 
weil as the anti-establishment; 15 % do not trust any side. On the average the highest trust is 
given the German government; the lowest the nuclear industry. 
The present report just gives the results of the first step of a broad project on the social reception 
of the Chemobyl accident. The following steps will focus on the institutional responses to the 
accident by govemment agencies, political institutions and research establishments. Finally it is 
planned to analyze the function of mass media in the transfer of information about the Chernobyl 
accident and its consequences for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The German version of this report has been published under the title "Die Reaktionen der Bevöl-
kerung auf die Ereignisse in Tschemobyl" as Jül-Spez-400 from the Nuclear Research Centre 
Jülich. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The Event 
The most serious reactor accident to date occurred in the Russian town of Chernobyl on 26 April 
1986. So far, the accident has claimed 31 human lives in the USSR, and a large number of late 
fatalities are expected. Estimates for the Federal Republic of Germany put the figure for additional 
deaths from cancer in the next few decades at 1501, 3752 or even 1,500 - 3,0003. Although 
Chernobyl is located some 1,500 kilometres from Bonn, it so.on became clear, after the implications 
had been underestimated to start with, that the political institutions and the population of the 
Federal Republic would not be able to play the part of uninvolved bystanders, but would have to 
engage in crisis management and crisis prevention. 
Considerable documentation is now available4 on the extent of the risk to the West German 
population, on the actual sequence of events at Chernobyl and on the immissions in Federal 
territory. On the other hand, little is known - beyond the personal impressions of those involved 
in the crisis management- about the response of society to the nuclear accident. The events during 
and after the reactor disaster in block 4 of the Soviet nuclear power station at Chernobyl were 
unexpected as the politicians and popu1ation of the Federal Republic were unprepared for such 
an accident. Vaguely defined competences, decentralized decision-making, lack of jurisdiction 
The Deutsches Atomforum in a Ieaflet of 22 May 1986. 
2 The KWU in its "Argumente" series, No. 57, dated 22 September 1986. 
3 Professors Harald Meinhold and Klaus Koppenhagen in their contribution "Risk = Risk?" The cancer 
risk following the reactor accident at Chernobyl, in comparison with other carcinogenic factors in the 
environment, in: Forschung Aktuell, special edition on Chernobyl, published by the TU Berlin, No. 
11-13, December 1986, p. 41. 
4 See, e.g. 
e Tschernobyl. Konsequenzen für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: a documentation presented by 
the Association of German Engineers, a supplement to the "VDI Nachrichten" No. 46/86, 
e Commission of the European Communities (ed.): The accident in the nuclear power station at 
Chernobyl and its consequences within the European Community, report by the Commission to 
the Council and The European Parliament, October 1986 
e Gesellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbh (ed.): Neuere Erkentnisse zum Unfall im Kern-
kraftwerk Tschernobyl (new facts on Chernobyl), GRS-S-40, November 1986 
e Report by the Federal Government on the reactor accident at Chernobyl and its consequences for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, 10th legislative period, printed matter 
10/6442 dated 12 November 1986 
e "Tschernobyl Info" from the Deutsches Atomforum dated 13 May 1986, with technical information 
on RBMK-1000. as well as: 
e "Tschernobyl Info", No. 2, from the Deutsches Atomforum dated 3 July 1986, with material on the 
reactor accident at Chernobyl, 
e "Forschung Aktuell", special edition on Chernobyl, published by the TU Berlin, No. 11-13, 
December 1986. 
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among the decision-makers and differences of opinion from the outset in assessing the scale of the 
danger between "established" and "alternative" experts, between the various state governments and 
the political parties, all made it difficult for people to find firm ground and make an adequate 
response - either as individuals, with a view to protecting their health (questions of nutrition), or 
as citizens, in view of the political consequences (future energy policy). 
From a sociological point of view, the reactions in the Federal Republic to the Chernobyl accident 
are of particular interest, because this example can be used to study the behaviour of a social sy-
stem faced with an unanticipated threat. Snap polls carried out a few days after the event at 
Chernobyl show that the accident had made a deep impression on public opinion: the number of 
convinced opponents of nuclear energy was now double the pre-Chernobyl level. 5 
Some months after the event, however, the state elections in Lower Saxony and Harnburg did not 
bring the definite successes that many observers had expected for the "anti-nuclear" parties, the 
Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens and, nine months later, the federal elections confirmed in 
office a government coalition that had refused to be flustered by the events at Chernobyl in its 
definite commitment to nuclear energy.6 This obvious discrepancy between drastic turnarounds in 
public opinion on nuclear energy, on the one hand, and voting patterns, on the other, makes it 
clear that considerable differentiation is necessary in examining people's attitudes to nuclear 
energy. Compared with other political topics, eg., the economic situation, Chernobyl is evidently 
of less significance to the average citizen than media reactions have suggested. 
Groups able to obtain effective publicity for their fears and helplessness must be contrasted with 
other sections of the community who are more or less indifferent in their response to the accident. 
This present analysis of a representative survey of the population on their perception of the 
Chernobyl disasterwill attempt to draw a more realistic picture of population responses than we 
obtain if we consider only those sections of the population that are more vocal in expressing an 
opinion. 
1.2 Projekt Design 
The reactor disaster at Chernobyl prompted the Technology and Society Program Group at the 
Jülich Nuclear Research Centre to design a research project capable of assessing the response of 
society to the Chernobyl events. This research concept is based roughly on the Critical Events 
Analysis?. 
The overall concept of the study involves a multi-stage process of social response to the physical 
and biological events at Chernobyl (Fig. 1). 
First of all, the event must be perceived at all before it can have social implications.8 "Eye-
witnesses", in a narrow andin a figurative sense, perceive events with their senses and with physical 
5 Allensbach polls 1984, No. 4045, and MayfJunefJu1y 1986, No. 4075 
6 This can be seen in the energy report submitted by the Federa1 Government on 26 September 1986, 
(Bundestag paper 10/6073). 
7 Kraus et al. (197 5). 
8 Luhmann writes that a socia1 system only responds to changes in its environment if these give rise to 
"resonances" (Luhmann, 1986, pp. 45-50). The years of controversy over nuclear energy bad perfectly 
provided the political system with a sounding board for perceiving an event like the reactor disaster at 
Chernobyl. Accordingly, the accident elicited a violent response which - retaining Luhmann's 
termino1ogy and borrowing from a phenomenon in nuclear physics - might be described as "giant 
resonance". Nevertheless, the fact that the event was integrated without any trouble into the political 
process does not mean that people were psychologically prepared for the event or that the political and 
administrative institutions bad anticipated such an event as a management problem. 
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Fig. 1 
Reactor accident at Chernobyl and its 
physical and biological consequences 
Perception of the events by 
eye witnesses" (science) 
Institutions of 
the political and 
administrative system 
I 
I 
-
General population 
'T' 
I 
Levels of processing by the social system of information on the reactor 
accident at Chernobyl and its interconnection by communication processes. 
(Solid lines in the illustration represent information on the accident 
at Chernobyl and its consequences; dotted lines stand for information on 
the responses of political actors and groups in society to these events. 
The thickness of the lines indicates the relative significance of the 
communication channel concerned.) 
measuring instruments and construct a picture of what has happened. This is done initially, on a 
naive pre-scientific basis, by the persons on the spot. Later, the experts examine the event, using 
their scientific techniques and procedures. Nevertheless, the resulting picture - like any picture -
no Ionger merely depicts the features of the subject-matter serving as a model, but also the interests 
of the "painter", his previous experience, his cognitive range, his cognitive categories, (cognitive 
paradigms) and so on. So the description of what happened depends not only on the actual event 
but also on the perceiver. 
Any Iimits to the cognitive range give rise to gaps in knowledge. Thus, where no measuring station 
was available, the precise immission of radionuclides will remaine unknown. Accordingly, the 
picture that scientists have been able to draw of the events at Chernobyl and of their consequences 
in the Federal Republic is fragmentary. 
Another point to consider is the fact that different people's "perceptions" may differ. Even 
scientists, who attempt to control perception by using objectifiable procedures, have their 
differences of opinion, especially where experience is not verifiable and measurements in the 
laboratory cannot be carried out under ceteris paribus conditions, but only - in the truest sense 
of the word - "in the field". 
As a result, the picture we obtain from eye-witness reports, measurements and subseq uent scientific 
analysis of the events at Chernobyl and their implications is neither complete nor free of 
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contradictions. However, within the scope of the following analysis of the response by society to 
the reactor disaster at Chernobyl, this picture does constitute the first level of reality: that of 
sCience. 
The knowledge availablc at this first Ievel on the disaster and its consequences is made public by 
various channels. The chief recipients in this respect are the institutions of the political and admi-
nistrative system - starting with the Federal Government and its agencies, and including interest 
groups and citizens' action committees - as well as the media. The direct transfer of information 
from science to the general public by way of scientists' interpersonal contacts in the private sphere 
and by information events at which scientists can address citizens directly, are likely to be 
insignificant by comparison. 
It is hardly possible to draw up a complete list of the channels used by the institutions of the 
political and administrative system to transfer information at various Ievels- from the national to 
the local level. The most formalized include, for example: 
e Written reports 
e Scientists participation as experts in discussions, conferences, committee meetings 
e Answers to enquiries. 
The relations between political and scientific institutions in Germany are characterized by a high 
degree of organizational interlocking, which is summed up here in such terms as "departmental 
research facilities", "national research centres", etc. The transfer of information from scientists to 
government institutions presented no special problems in the case of Chernobyl. The channels 
needed were in existence and could be used without major delays.9 
The media receive information from the scientific field through a number of channels. This 
involves, eg., handing over material that has been produced for other purposes, special press 
releases, press conferences and interviews.lO 
The information supplied by the scientific system is processed within the system of political insti-
tutions. Assessments are made, conclusions drawn, judgements added ( on relevance, dangers, 
consequences, need for action, strategies, etc.), and any gaps in scientific data closed by plausibility 
calculations. An important role in this respect is played by the various interests, intentions, basic 
convictions and paradigms of the political actors. Thus, the same input of information provided 
by science may be subjected by different actors to different evaluations and give rise to different 
political conclusions. This goes to explain, for example, why German Christian Democrats (CDU) 
and Social Democrats (SPD) responded differently to the events at Chernobyl and why different 
regulatory responses were triggered in the various states governed by them, although exactly the 
sameinformationwas available.l 1 
In processing the information, political institutions can be influenced in various ways by the 
reactions of the population, for whose perception political institutions and politicians in particular 
(as a precondition for political survival in a democracy) have developed finely tuned sensors. Most 
of all, however, their responses depend on reports in the mass media, which inform them about 
how their activities are received by the public and about what is on the "political agenda" of the 
9 Quite a different question is whether the scientific infrastructure (measuring network and central 
evaluation) was adequate to monitor the overall radioactive contamination in the Federal Republic at 
any time. In this respect, many lessons will have to be learned from' the Chernobyl experience. On the 
other band, these are deficits in the institutionalization of continuous scientific monitoring of the 
environment which cannot be discussed within the framework of this paper, and do not involve deficits 
in communication between science and the competent political institutions. 
IO On the channels of information transfer from science system to mass media, cf. Peters (1984), pp. 79-83. 
II Eg., the Iimits for the sale of milk and green vegetables ranged from 500 Bq/1 (Federal Government) 
to 20 Bq/1 (Hesse) in the case of milk and from 250 Bq/kg (Federal Government) to 50 Bq/kg 
(Schleswig-Holstein) in the case of green vegetables. 
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day. Furthermore, they are given information on the activities of other political institutions to 
which they may have to respond. 12 At all rate, the processing of the information on the events at 
Chernobyl generates a second level of reality: that of political evaluation. 
The media, as the third level in our scheme of things, report both on the information they obtain 
from the scientific sector and - indeed primarily - on the response of the political institutions to 
the events at Chernobyl. So they convey information about the behaviour of political actors, first 
of all to the general public, but also back to the political and administrative system. It might even 
be said that the political and administrative system observes (and controls) itself with the aid of 
the mass media. 
Realistic analyses of mass media content conclude that the biggest share by far of their content is 
obtained from the public relations efforts of various institutions.IJ The picture we may have of a 
reporter rushing to the scene of some happening in order to report directly to his readers as an 
eye-witness is very largely a myth. This is, of course, particularly true in the case of the reactor 
accident at Chernobyl. Western journalists were unable to take a look at the scene of the accident. 
And, even the effects of the accident radioactive immissions in the Federal Republic were only 
available in the indirect form of statements made by scientists. Journalists, after all, do not have 
the necessary measuring equipment or know-how. 
The media are always compelled to make selective use of the material at their disposal. In doing 
so, they must decide on: 
e the credibility of the source of information, 
e the relative importance of different information, 
e the efforts required to convey this information. 
Further considerations affecting the decision-making process - and varying in importance from 
case to case - involve, eg., questions of balanced reporting, acceptance of material by publishers, 
directors of broadcasting companies or radio councils, the specific expectations of the media target 
group and sales figures or ratings. 
The upshot is that the media, too, assessed the available information, in a manner similar to that 
of the political institutions and - depending on basic attitudes and loyalties among media editors 
- arrived at different assessments of the acuteness of the danger to the population. 
The result of this selection process is not a reduction in the variance of assessments of the events 
at Chernobyl by the political and administrative system, but an increase. This is promoted by the 
media's inherent tendency to focus attention on conflict rather than consensus and on extreme 
political viewpoints instead of cautious evaluations. On the third level, therefore, we find a media 
reality which is marked by a large number of contradictions both within one medium and between 
different media. The collection of different information, opinions and assessments to form a 
comprehensive picture is not performed by the mass media themselves, but is left to the individual 
reader or viewer. 
For the general public, the media formed the chief source of information on Chernobyl, although 
they also provided the least orientation. As a consequence, much use was made of additional 
sources of information, eg., the numerous telephone advisory services or public meetings at which 
scientists could supply information. The ideas encountered at $his fourth level in our concept are 
taken to be the general public's level of reality. 
In keeping with the scheme of things just described, our approach involves a combination of 
different empirical surveys generating results that can then be interlocked. 
12 On the interdependences of political protagonists mass media and public, cf. Peters (1984), pp. 45-48, 
and a series of specific American studies like that of Dunn (1982) and Miller (1978). 
13 Cf. Baerns (1985). 
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l. Non-standardized explorative interviews with families 
2. Standardized representative opinion polls 
3. Specific oral interviews with representatives of the main social actors (ministries, radiation 
protection commission, scientific facilities, interest groups, etc.) 
4. Content analysis of public statements of major social actors 
5. Oral interviews with joumalists 
6. Content analysis of mass media reporting on Chemobyl 
The order in which empirical surveys are carried out is decided primarily by the neccessity of 
recording transitory data as soon as possible. We may assume that the reactions of the general 
public to Chemobyl will be most likely to be subject to a process of forgetting and modification. 
For this reason, the first step involved the planning and implementing of a representative opinion 
poll accompanied by some thirty non-standardized in-depth interviews with families in various 
areas of the Federal Republic, where different Ievels of radioactivity had been measured. 14 
Events in the political and administrative system, in contrast, can probably be reconstructed to 
provide valid results even after a certain interval of time, since much of what happened is 
documented in a written form. Again, the interviews with representatives of social actors and 
joumalists some time after the event can also be feasible - since the interviewees were, and may 
still be, dealing professionally with the material. The least critical source, as far as time intervals 
are concemed, is the content analysis of written Statements and documentation and of the mass 
media, which are available in archives at any time. 
The present report deals in the main with the results of an analysis of the first representative 
surveys of public opinion on Chemobyl and discusses some of the political issues involved. 
1.3 Cognitive Goals 
This representative survey of the population, which - as was said earlier - constitutes only one step 
in a larger project design, has three main cognitive goals: 
1. The first object is to examine how the general public perceived the reactor disaster at 
Chemobyl and its implications, especially for the Federal Republic. How dangeraus was the 
incident considered to be? 
2. The second object was to identify the consequences drawn by the general public from the 
events at Chemobyl, viz. in two respects 
e with regard to any change in eating habits which had been recommended by a !arge 
number of institutions through the media and advisory services, and 
e with regard to the political consequences that should be drawn for energy policy in the 
Federal Republic. 
3. In their attempts to obtain orientation, the public was entirely dependent on secondary 
sources of information. Hardly anybody had any direct experience. Hence we were interested 
in the process of opinion-forming in the general public under conditions of absolute 
dependence on secondary sources, and, in particular in how the credibility of various sources 
of information were assessed andin the role played by television in forming opinions. 
14 The three selected regions were: The run~l district of Dithmarschen in Schleswig-Holstein, the city of 
Duisburg in North Rhine-Westphalia and the town and rural district of Augsburg in Bavaria. 
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2 Method 
2.1 Questions 
Our catalogue contained 16 questions of different kinds. 15 They cover the following points: 
1. Perceived impact of environmental pollution on health in general. 
2. Position in view of the future use of nuclear energy (shutdown). 
3. Perceived cause of reactor disaster at Chernobyl. 
4. Perceived safety of West German nuclear power stations compared with Russian. 
5. Estimated number of fatalities as a consequence of the reactor accident at Chemobyl in the 
USSR and in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
6. Change in eating habits as a result of the reactor disasterat Chemobyl. 
7. Perceived darnage to personal health as a result of the reactor disaster at Chemobyl. 
8. Any action taken to protect small children (asked where the household concemed had any 
children under the age of 6). 
9. Perceived darnage to the health of children under 6 (asked where the household had children 
under 6). 
10. Assessment of the credibility of various institutions with regard to the information they 
fumished on the reactor disaster. 
11. Assessment of balance and accuracy in television reporting on Chemobyl. 
2.2 Implementation of the Survey 
The questions were presented to a representative cross-section of the population involving 1,965 
persons as part of an omnibus survey held between 15 November and 5 December 1986. The 
statistical population was the resident German population over 14 years in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and West Berlin.l6 
The date of the survey was at a considerable interval, viz. approx. 7 months, after the event. This 
is no serious drawback, since the object was not so much to document the agitation of public 
opinion during the first few days and weeks after the event but to record the stable pattem of 
opinions and attitudes resulting from a - more or less intense - consideration of the Chemobyl 
events. Nevertheless, this "stability" can only be relative. Following the reactor accident at 
Harrisburgh, which only affected the West Germanpopulation at a "cognitive" level and was not 
so close to home as Chemobyl, there had been a similar increase in oppositio:Q. to nuclear energy 
in the population. Comparatively soon, however, this had declined again virtually to the pre-
Harrisburgh level. Whether there will be a similar process of "forgetting" Chemobyl or whether the 
15 The wording of the questions and the distribution of the answers are contained in the Appendix. 
16 The survey was carried out by the poiJing institute Infratest Sozialforschung, Munich, on behalf of the 
Jülich Nuclear Research Centre. The questions were compiled by the Technology and Society Program 
Group and finalized in collaboration with Dr. Walter Ruhland of Infratest. Following the survey and 
coding, the survey data were made available by Infratest as a magnetic tape and statistically analyzed 
by the authors. 
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consequence will be Ionger-term in view of the direct shock experienced, will be examined m 
repeats of our survey in the early summer of 1987 and 1988. 
The interviewees were selected by a multiple-stratified multi-stage random sample. The exhaustion 
rate of the sample was 67 %; 10-15 % of the non-responses are to be regarded as neutral for the 
sample. 17 
In view of the duster effect in the selection, there is a magnification of the sampling error -
compared with a simple random selection in which the choice of one element is independent of the 
others. In calculating the error from shares, Infratestquotesan empirically obtained magnification 
factor of.J2. Accordingly, the estimated errors of other parameters like correlation coefficients, 
model parameters, etc., which presuppose a simple random selection, may prove to be too 
optimistic. In view of the rather explorative character of the analysis, however, it was feit that a 
consistent treatment of the duster effect in a calculation of significances and error intervals seemed 
to be neither necessary nor to be justified with respect to the effort involved. Throughout, 
therefore, we made the standard assumption of a simple random selection, so that the true 
statistical errors are underestimated a little. 
2.3 Weighting 
On the basis of a comparison of the sample with the total population, weighting factors were 
calculated to correct any systematic departures of the sample from the population caused, eg., by 
Iosses in interviews, taking account of the following features: 
e Federal state 
e Government district 
e Town type (after Boustedt) 
e Age 
e Sex 
In the statistical analysis, systematic use was made of weighted data. On the other hand, the 
departures of the weighted from the unweighted sample mostly concerned positions after the 
decimal point so that they do not affect the substantive interpretation. 
17 Infratest figures. 
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3 The Results 
3.1 Perception of a Threat from Chernobyl 
The nurnber of those questioned who feared serious darnage to their personal health or to that of 
their children is clearly below 20 % (Fig. 2). Even in their answers to the general question about 
the nurnber of victirns in the Federal Republic, only slightly over. one third of those questioned 
believe that rnore than 10 people will die as the result of delayed injuries caused by the increase in 
radioactivity following the reactor accident at Chernobyl (Table 1). If we cornpare this with the 
figures suggested even by representatives of the "nuclear Iobby'' (cf. page 1), it becornes clear that 
exaggerated statistical expectations of darnage are held at rnost by minorities in the population. 
On the other hand, the fact that the percentage of the interviewees who explicitly fear darnage to 
their health is below 20 % does not rnean that the vast rnajority of the population has no serious 
fears with regard to the possible health irnplications of Chernobyl. A considerable proportion of 
the interviewees answered the question about probable consequences for their health with a "don't 
know". Now this category can be viewed in different ways, depending on question context. In the 
present case, we interpret the answers in this category as indicating uncertainty. 
So, although only a rninority are firmly convinced that the irnpact of the accident at Chernobyl 
involves health darnage for thernselves or for their children, sorne 40 % of those questioned do 
not cornpletely rule out such consequences, even though they hope and believe that they will not 
occur. In view of the date of the survey - rnore than 6 rnonths after the Chernobyl accident - we 
rnust conclude that "uncertainty" did not just exist ternporarily in the first few weeks after the 
disaster owing to the uproar of events, but is still very rnuch with us - even at such a distance in 
time. 
The results of the accompanying in-depth interviews show that the uncertainty is not necessarily 
associated with Iack of interest in the events at Chemobyl. In fact, it initiated an intense process 
of analysing the information on the event, although this did not Iead to any reduction in 
uncertainty. 
The answers to three questions as to the expected consequences of Chernobyl, each of which 
contained as an alternative answer a "don't know" 18, were used to construct an index "uncertainty 
about the consequences of Chernobyl" with a value scale of 0 to 3, according to how often the 
category "don't know" was chosen in the three questions. This index can be employed to interpret 
the degree of uncertainty feit with regard to the consequences of Chernobyl. The uncertainty is 
clearly correlated with various sociodemographic variables (Table 2). One interesting point is that, 
among women, uncertainty grows with age, although no definite relationship of this kind can be 
observed among rnen (Fig. 3). So, elderly wornen are the population group that suffers rnost from 
the uncertainty associated with the consequences of the reactor disasterat Chernobyl. This is even 
more the case where the women are widows. 19 
1x See Appendix: questions 4, 5 and 9. 
19 Why this is so is not quite clear. Two explanations seem possible. First of all, most women over 55 are 
moulded by the traditional roles assigned to man and woman, according to which the private domestic 
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An index "general environmental sensitivity"2o, calculated from three individual questions, 
measures the degree of expected darnage to health from environmental pollution in general. This 
correlates in a highly significant fashion, though with a mean intensity of only (rb =0.25), with the 
perception of a specific risk to health from Chemobyl. As expected, Chemobyl has alarmed 
specifically those who are especially sensitive to environmental pollution in general. 
Contrary to our expectations, the mean figure for the concem felt about children's health is no 
greater than the concem felt by the interviewees about their own health, if we consider the group 
of interviewees with children under the age of 6. Quite the contrary: more interviewees in this 
group state that they feel their own health is more at risk than that of their children. The reasons 
sphere is primarily a woman's responsibility and the "public" activities are a man's concern. 
Accordingly, uncertainty is likely if judgements are expected on public matters, but the man is not 
available as the competent "authority". Another conceivable explanationisthat the death of the busband 
entails a reduction in interpersonal contacts. although these contacts have an important function when 
it comes to assessing information (eg. from the mass media), especially where such information is 
contradictory. 
20 To obtain the index, three statements were used to which the interviewees could respond with approval 
or rejection (see question I, Appendix). The three statements were: 
1. Present-day life expectancy, i.e. the fact that people now live Ionger than they used to do, shows 
that pollution has no serious impact on health. 
2. Although pollution does involve a risk to health, this can be restricted by taking proper action. 
3. Illnesses caused by pollution represent one of the gravest threats today, and medicine is hardly able 
to protect us. 
Where only the first or the first and the second statements were approved, the environmental sensitivity 
was classified as "slight". Approval of the second statement rated an "average", that of the second and 
third Statements a "strong", and approval of the third only "very strong". Interviewees who gave 
inconsistent answers (affirming the first and third Statements) or undifferentiated answers (affirming 
or denying all three statements) were excluded (13. 7 % in all), as being "unclassifiable", from the ordinal 
scale. 
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% 
None 13.1 
< 10 people 5.1 
10-100 people 6.7 
100-1,000 people 11.3 
1,000-10,000 people 9.3 
10,000-100,000 people 4.3 
> 100,000 people 2.8 
Don't know 47.4 
100.0 
(N= 1,953) 
Table 1 Presumed nurober of fatalities in the Federal Republic owing to the reactor 
disaster at Chernobyl 
Own children 
General environ- 0.04 
mental sensitivity 
Nuclear energy risk 0.02 
compared with UdSSR 
Perception of darnage 0.02 
to personal health 
Change in personal 0.07 ** 
diet 
Position on use of 0.00 
nuclear energy 
Uncertainty about -0.06 ** 
Chernobyl consequences 
Measure: Kendall's 'b 
Sex Education 
0.02 -0.01 
0.18 ** -0.07 ** 
-0.01 0.05 * 
0.09 ** 0.17 .. 
0.12 ** 0.03 
0.11 ** -0.14 ** 
Age 
-0.07 ** 
-0.09 ** 
-0.08 ** 
-0.03 
-0.05 * 
0.16 ** 
* significant at 5-%-level 
** significant at !-%-Ievel 
Table 2 Associations of some substantivevariables with sociodemographic criteria 
for this arenot quite clear; the interviewees may feel that most infants had been given special baby 
food, so that a risk to their health can be ruled out. The difference between this group and those 
who perceive health risks for themselves and/or for their children is not significant, however. So 
one should avoid overinterpreting this result. What is very clear is that there is a high correlation 
between the perception of darnage to personal health and tothat of one's own children (Tb =0.61). 
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3.2 Consequences 1: Changes In Eating Habits? 
80 
In view of the media reporting on the radioactive contamination of food and the recommendations 
published by various agencies on restricting the consumption, eg., of fresh milk, salad, game and 
wild mushrooms, it is quite surprising that these recommendations, though disseminated with 
considerable publicity, were followed by less than one half of the population (Fig. 4). 
It is not quite clear how precisely the answers given by the interviewees reflect the extent of actual 
changes in diet. On the one hand, it is possible that many men did not even notice changes to their 
bill of fare at home. This might explain why definitely fewer men than women stated that they had 
changed their diet. On the other hand, considerable normative pressure from public opinion to 
change nutritional patterns, especially in view of small children, definitely did exist. This pressure 
would make the answer "yes" to our question about changes in nutritional patterns appear socially 
desirable, so this may tend to overestimate the extent of actual changes made. We may plausibly 
assume that our data exaggerate rather than underestimate actual changes in eating habits. 
Basically, the changes affected a partial avoidance of salad and fresh vegetables, fresh milk and 
fresh milk products, wild mushrooms and game.zl 
Unfortunately, no figures are available as yet for radiological contamination in Germany with a 
breakdown by state, although a comparison of the percentages of the interviewees who stated that 
they had changed their eating habits with rough estimates of the actual contamination in the 
21 Although the point was not examined in further detail, the percentage of the interviewees who stated 
that they had gone without game and forest mushrooms because of Chernobyl seems to be too high. 
The percentage of the population that consumes game and forest mushrooms with any regularity is 
likely to be much less than the over 65 % who stated that they had gone without such food because 
of Chernobyl. 
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Fig. 4 
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their children after Chernobyl 
54X Yes 
various federal states does suggest that the frequency of dietary change is hardly correlated with 
actual radiological contamination in the area concerned. 
In fact, changes in diet vary considerably with sociodemographic variables. In addition to the 
already mentioned association with the sex of the interviewees, there is, most of all, a close 
relationship with educationallevels. In addition, nutritional changes occur, on average, more often 
in households with children below the age of 6. This latter effect is again dependent on educational 
Ievels and is particularly striking at the highest Ievels (Fig. 5). 
Since the media referred again and again to the special risk to children from radioactively 
contaminated food, it is not surprising that changes in eating patterns occurred particularly often 
in households with small children. In addition to the objectivly existing higher risk to infants, one 
psychological factor often revealed in the accompanying in-depth interviews may have played a 
role: as long as the health risk from radioactively contaminated food only concerned the 
interviewees themselves, those questioned were on average much less worried than where the risk 
also concerned other persons in the household - eg. spouse or, and above all, their children. From 
a feeling of responsibility towards dependents (with respect to food), the interviewees tend to be 
over-cautious - measured against their own assessment of the risk.22 
It is by no means the case that interviewees with a lower educational Ievel - in general terms - ex-
press less concern about the effects of environmental pollution on their health than others with a 
better education. Nonetheless, interviewees with a better education did alter their eating habits 
more often than those with less education. This may be due to an cognitive overtaxation of the 
latter group. Faced with a range of fragmentary and, in some cases, Contradietory information, the 
consequences may be a paralysis of the willingness to act - dependent on cognitive abilities. Less 
well-educated interviewees presumably End it hard to draw consequences for action from their 
attitudes. 
Another - equally plausible - interpretation is that less (half-)knowledge means less fear. Since -
taking a realistic view - even those with a higher education will have, at most, half-knowledge 
about dosage effect relations and the extent of a risk, and this half-knowledge will tend to 
emphasize the threatening aspects, it would appear plausible that a higher Ievel of information will 
tend, on average, to be accommpanied by a feeling of being at risk. And in fact, the distribution 
22 Furtheranalysis of the data showed that this explanation is in fact only true of the warnen questioned 
and not of the men (cf. Chapter 3.5). 
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of the answers to the question about the risks to personal health from the Chernobyl accident does 
show this educational effect - although weaker than in the change of diet (Table 2). 
People with children of their own under the age of 6 were asked separately if they had changed the 
diets of these children. For the reasons discussed above, interviewees with small children did, on 
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average, change the diets of their infants and pre-school children as weil as their own diets more 
frequently than interviewees with out small children. The change in diet for small children is very 
highly correlated with the change in interviewees' own eating habits ('rb = 0.66) which indicates 
that, in most cases, the eating habits of the whole farnily and not of individual members were 
changed. 
Even more so than in the changes to personal eating habits in the population as a whole, we find 
a connection between changes in children's diets and Ievel of education in that section of the 
interviewees with small children (Fig. 6). Three times more graduates stated that they had changed 
their children's diets than interviewees in the lowest educational group. 
3.3 Consequences II: Rejection of Nuclear Energy? 
Chemobyl was obviously an occasion for many people to reconsider their attitudes to the use of 
nuclear energy in the Federal Republic. Many saw this as a confirmation of their demand that the 
use of nuclear energy be confined to a transitional period or even be discontinued at once. 
A question on the future use of nuclear energy was intended to obtain an answer that was as 
differentiated as possible on how the population of the Federal Republic views the future of 
(nuclear) energy policy. The alternative answers were formulated in such a way as to outline - in 
a simplified manner - the chief political positions on nuclear energy as advocated after Chemobyl: 
e We should use as much nuclear energy as possible and, wherever necessary, build further 
power stations ("as much as possible") 
e We should maintain the present Ievel of nuclear energy and build new nuclear power station 
only when existing stations are shut down ("maintain current Ievel") 
e We should use the nuclear power stations now in operation or under construction until the 
end of their life, but not build any new stations ("no new nuclear power stations") 
e We should shut down our nuclear power stations in the course of the next few years and 
entirely dispense with nuclear energy ("slow withdrawal") 
e We should shut down all our nuclear power stations at once ("immediate withdrawal") 
For some assessments, the last two categories ("slow withdrawal" and "immediate withdrawal") 
were combined and called "accelerated withdrawal", since these two options involved definite 
decisions on shutdowns and not merely a rejection of new licensing procedures. 
Nearly two thirds of the interviewees advocate - more or less rapid - discontinuation of nuclear 
energy in the Federal Republic (Fig. 7). Ofthis total, some 40 % are in favour of an accelerated 
withdrawal, ie. of the shutdown of nuclear power stations before the end of their normallives. The 
radical energy-policy position of immediate withdrawal is supported by less than 10 %. On the 
other hand, on1y about 7 % of the interviewees are in favour of expanding nuclear energy. 
The attitude to the nuclear energy question again reflects familiar sociodemographic patterns 
(Table 2). Accordingly, younger interviewees rather than older, women rather than men and 
people with more rather than less education advocate accelerated withdrawal. On the other hand, 
only the dependence on the sex of the interviewee is of any importance; this indicates that any 
interrelationship with age and Ievel of education is not linear and that the interaction effects 
between sociodemographic variables may be considerable. 
Concealed behind all these weak associations, there are many surprises in details. Hence, the re-
lations between the rejection of nuclear energy and age is by no means monotonic (Fig. 8). In fact, 
the greatest degree of rejection is encountered among the 26-30 year-olds, ie. not among the 
youngest interviewees. A sirnilar result was obtained - using quite different methods -in 1979 by 
Renn in a survey covering five towns and cities in North Rhine-Westphalia (Renn, 1984, p. 273). 
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The explanation of this finding is not trivial. In the first place it is not clear whether this is a cohort 
effect, i.e. with the maximum of rejection moving in time through all age groups, or whether it is 
a life-cycle related effect, so that the peak will be found at this point in later surveys as well. 
Accordingly, there are two classes of explanations: 
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1. Explanations which are based on changes in attitudes among individuals going through 
various phases in their lives, and 
2. those based on changing socialization conditions and "conditioning" in the interviewees' 
youth, like the post materialism theory oflnglehart (Inglehart, 1977) and postulating a change 
in attitudes from generation to generation. 
A decision between the two alternative explanations would require a time series analysis covering 
several decades, for which we lack the necessary data. Nonetheless, some hypotheses should be 
discussed here. 
The obvious assumption, that the peak is mainly caused by the parents of small children being 
particularly afraid of the consequences of radioactive contamination from nuclear power stations, 
can be refuted with the facts. If we exclude interviewees with children of their own from the 
analysis, the peak among the 26-30 year-olds is even more marked. So it is not the worried parents 
who account for the maximum among those advocating withdrawal, but as a more precise analysis 
shows students and young academics who are especially often in favour of withdrawal from 
nuclear energy. 
Another plausible explanation refers to the fact that the present generation of 26-30 year-olds was 
the lasttobe politically "conditioned" as 12-16 year-olds before the first oil crisis in 1973 i.e. in 
the final heyday of euphoric growth, whereas the following cohorts grew up under the influence 
of the "limits to growth", the energy crisis, etc. and experienced the availability of energy as a 
problem. This explanation is based on Inglehart's socialization hypothesis, according to which 
those values are regarded as being especially important that were feit to be threatened during a 
critical phase in young people's socialization process (lnglehart, 1977, p. 72ff.). 
Presumably, factors like the experience of shortage or indicators of shortage, as well as other 
factors like the dominance of certain values dependent on a particular phase in our lives play a role 
which is reflected, for example, in the fact that economic values are feit to be rather unimportant 
until the time comes for us to assume the responsibility for a family or the continued existence of 
a business company. 
Much the same argument can be used to explain the minimum in the rejection of nuclear energy 
among the 51-55 year-olds. This is the group of those who bear a special responsibility in business 
life, who grew up during and after the War under the influence of genuine want, who in the post-
War years, worked on the economic reconstruction in Germany and, in the process, internalized 
the goals prevailing at that time. 
3.4 Conjidence in Institutions and Media 
The formation of public opinion on the events at Chernobyl and the consequences for the Federal 
Republic was largely based on information that was available only through the impersonal 
channels of the mass media. At the same time, this information was contradictory in a double 
sense: 
1. First of all, contradictory assessments from various sources were quoted in one and the same 
medium or contribution: the opinions of the Greensand the SPD were contrasted with those 
of the Federal Government. 
2. Secondly, there were serious differences in the accounts given by various media or editors, and 
these were reflected in the sources selected in each case, in the way theinformationwas quoted 
and, finally, in the commentaries given. 
The reader or viewer, who generally uses more than only one medium, say television, radio, 
newspaper and magazine, can only find his way through this mass of often incomplete and 
incomprehensible information if he has effective heuristic strategies for information reduction and 
aggregation at bis disposal. In view of the remoteness of information on radioactive contamination 
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from everyday life, it is hardly possible to evaluate the content of the information23; all the 
individual can do is to rely on the credibility of the sources of the information, and people do 
believe they judge this.24 Whether people believe a source of information or not depends on a !arge 
number of factors, like 
e familiarity of the source of information 
e status of the source of information 
e past experience with the source of information 
e social proximity to the source of information 
e credited competence 
e presumed dependence on or independence of interest groups25 
The relative importance of these factors will, in turn, vary with the political commitment, the 
educational background, age, etc. of each individual. 
Confidence in the evaluation of information can be encountered at two different Ievels: 
I. Firstly, credibility is allocated at the Ievel of the primary communicators like the Government, 
interest groups, parties, organizations (research facilities, etc), associations and citizens' action 
committees. The media inform the individual about the views of the Federal Government, 
opposition, scientists from nuclear research centres or the Ecological Institute and- depending 
on his assessment of their credibility - will, should contradictions arise, trust the one side or 
the other. He will try to assess which side is exaggerating and which side is playing down the 
issue, and will then draw his own picture of reality. There is clear evidence that this act of 
evaluating information supplied by the mass media is not a purely cognitive process inside the 
individual, but is crucially influenced by everyday interpersonal communication.26 
2. The media are not just "mouthpieces" for the opinions of primary communicators, for they 
themselves select and, explicitly or implicitly, evaluate information by pointing, eg., to 
contradictions, by referring to extreme opinions as such, by recalling past errors or 
judgements of a primary communicator, etc. The public can thus facilitate its orientation by 
using the pre-assessed information of the media as a basis. On the other hand, since the media 
after Chernobyl themselves took different stands, the individual was faced with the question 
of assigning credibility to them as weiL 
In the present survey, time did not permit a detailed inquiry into all the aspects mentioned. The 
questions dealing with information on the reactor accident at Chernobyl and its consequences were 
confined to the credibility ascribed to 6 primary communicators 
e Federal Government 
e Opposition 
e Nuclear Research Centres 
e Ecological Institute 
e Nuclear Power Industry 
23 Where this did happen, it was often inadequate, compared to scientific knowledge. This will be 
demonstrated by the concomitant in-depth interviews, which are still being systematically assessed at 
the moment. 
24 Luhmann has convincingly shown how the allocation of trust can reduce environmental complexity and 
hence facilitate orientation (Luhmann, 1968). 
25 The planned second survey is to examine a simplified model for allocating credibility, containing the 
factors familiarity, assigned competence and presumed independence. 
26 An important roJe is played here by theories like the opinion Ieader concept employed by Katz (1952) 
to explain media impact. Without knowing exactly how the relationship works, it is becoming clear that 
the media impact cannot be considered in isolation and that the interaction of mass communication and 
interpersonal communication is also important. Cf. the new paper by Kepplinger/Martin (1986). 
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e Citizens' Action Com.mittees 
and, by way of comparison 
e J ournalists. 
This latter group does not quite fit into the scheme of things. Nevertheless, where journalists 
discard their cloak of journalistic anonymity and address the public as commentators or 
moderators, i.e. as "institutions", they do acquire some of the qualities of a "primary 
communicator" like a politician or scientist. 
With regard to the credibility of the media, two questions were asked about the perceived 
correctness and balance in television reporting. The object of these two questions was to indicate 
the degree of critical detachment of the public with regard to this medium. The answers should 
not be taken as an evaluation of television reporting itself. 
Surprisingly, the credibility question did not show great differences between primary 
com.municators (Fig. 9). Except for the nuclear power industry, which fewer than 35 % of the 
interviewees consider to be "completely or partly credible", all other six groups are rated between 
50 % and 60 %. This means, eg., that 
e citizens' action committees are believed no less than, say, the Federal Government and 
e the Ecological Institute, with a staff of perhaps a few dozen and a relatively short history of 
research, enjoys as much confidence among the general public as the established nuclear 
research centres with a total staff of some 8,000. 
These facts make it clear that the ecological movement has made itself respected beyond its own 
direct circle of supporters and finds a willing ear among many other citizens as weiL 
Another striking result is that the "political" actors, who have no technical competence and are 
particularly exposed to the reproach of being dependent on special interests, have the same 
credibility rating as the scientist, who should, after all, be "disinterested"27 and competent but is 
obviously not seen in this way by many citizens. 
The relations between the credibility ascribed to different institutions and sociodemographic 
featuresarenot very marked, but significant in some cases (Table 3). They show, for example, that 
women generally have rather more confidence than men, that a better educational background 
tends to be accompanied by greater distrust as regards the Federal Government, opposition and 
industry, but with greater confidence in the Ecological Institute, and that the older interviewees 
trust the Federal Government and industry more than younger interviewees do, but they are more 
sceptical about the Ecological Institute and citizens' action committees. 
If we examine the correlations of credibility among the seven institutions, we can identify two 
distinct groups, composed as follows: 
1. Government, nuclear research centres and industry 
2. Ecological Institute, citizens' action committees and - to a lesser extent - journalists. 
The credibilities are clearly correlated with one another within each group and low between insti-
tutions in the two groups (Table 4). The "Opposition" is not definitely assigned to one group; its 
ascribed credibility correlates moderately with all others and most strongly with that of the 
Government,28 The clear correlation between the credibility of Government and Opposition, 
27 According to a dassie sociological analysis of science by R.K. Merton, "Disinterestedness" is one of the 
four central norms of science (Merton, 1957, p. 558). 
28 The Opposition is likely to be perceived ambivalently, first of all as an established political force, and 
then as an institiution in opposition to the government. 
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Fig. 9 Trustworthiness of information on the reactor disaster at Chernobyl 
and its impact on the Federal Republic 
Own children Sex Education 
Federal Government -0.04 0.07 •• -0.10 •• 
Opposition -0.02 0.03 -0.10 •• 
Nuclear research centres -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Ecological Institute 0.05. 0.06. 0.08 •• 
Nuclear power industry 0.01 0.00 -0.08 •• 
Citizens' action committees 0.07 •• 0.10 •• -0.01 
Journalists 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Age 
0.12 •• 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.13 •• 
0.08 •• 
-0.06. 
-0.01 
Measure: Kendall's rb • significant at 5-%-level 
•• significant at 1-%-level 
Table 3 Associations of ascribed credibility with sociodemographic criteria 
however, is impressive evidence that the energy-policy controversy is difficult to locate in the 
traditionalleft versus right scheme of things. 
The interpretation of these relationships is underpinned by a factor analysis of the corresponding 
correlation matrix, which provides an unambiguous result in the shape of two independent factors 
corresponding to the groups described above.29 
29 Statistically, the use of factor analysis is questionable on account of the supposition of a metric scale 
20 Reactions to Chernobyl 
Federa1 Nuclear Nuclear Oppo-
Government research industry sition 
Federa1 Government 0.52 ** 0.51 ** 0.44 ** 
Nuclear research 0.49 ** 0.24 ** 
Nuclear industry 0.23 ** 
Opposition 
Eco1ogica1 Institute 
Citizens' committees 
Jouma1ists 
Measure: Kendall's 'b 
Eco1ogica1 
Institute 
-0.14** 
-0.06 * 
-0.16** 
0.25 ** 
Citizens' Journa-
committees 1ists 
0.07 ** 0.08 ** 
-0.12 ** 0.02 
-0.13 ** 0.07 * 
0.22 ** 0.20 ** 
0.52 ** 0.28 ** 
0.37 ** 
* significant at 5-%-1evel 
** significant at !-%-Ievel 
Table 4 Matrix of the ordinal association between the credibility of different 
institutions 
The two factors can be typified as "credibility of the establishment" and "credibility of the anti-
establishment", if we can view the Government, nuclear research centres and industry as 
established institutions and the Ecological Institute, citizens' action committees and journalists as 
tending to be institutions in opposition to the establishment.Jo 
The result of this factor analysis contradicts all expectations. It means that the confidence placed 
in the established institutions is not highly negative in its correlation with confidence in the anti-
establishment institutions. The two sectors represent independent dimensions, after all. Thus, if 
someone trusts the information supplied by national research centres, this does not automatically 
mean that he distrusts information from the Ecological Institute - nor vice versa. So we have a 
!arge number of interviewees who have confidence both in the established and in the non-
established institutions. 
A noteworthy fact is that the "Opposition" (certainly identified primarily with the SPD) is partly 
credible for both the "establishment" group and the "anti-establishment" group. The opposition is 
on the fence, which may, on the one hand, help explain the electoral defeats of recent months 
(Federal Parliament, State Parliament in Hesse), while, on the other hand, making it clear that the 
SPD could form a bridge between the political camps of the establishment and the anti-
establishment. An earlier study also revealed an ambivalence among SPD supporters with regard 
to nuclear energy, whereas the followers of the CDU and the FDP, on the one hand, and the 
Greens, on the other, are much more homogeneaus in their support or rejection of nuclear energy 
(Peters et.al., 1984, p. 24). 
in credibility values. On the other band, the result is so unequivocal and also in keeping with the 
inspection of the matrix of ordinary associations (Table 4), that it may be supposed that the statistically 
obtained factors are based on substantive patterns for assessing credibility. 
30 In the case of the Ecological Institute and the citizens' action committees, this seems directly plausible, 
although it is not immediately obvious in the case of journalists. What journalists have in common with 
the other two institutions isthat (perhaps less in practice than in their image) they critically observe and 
scrutinize the activities of ruling, powerful and established groups. So it would appear to be quite 
Iegitimate to include the journalists under this heading, although it must be borne in mind that this is 
a Iabel not a semantic category. 
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Fig. 10 Classification of population in four "confidence types" 
The results of the factor analysis were used to classify the interviewees into four different 
"confidence-types", in line with their answers to the credibility question. For this purpose, two 
dichotomous indices "confidence in establishment" and "confidence in anti-establishment" were 
constructed3I and cross-tabulated. Each field in the 2 * 2 matrix corresponds to one confidence 
type. About one quarter of the interviewees trust both the establishment and the anti-
establishment; a further quarter trust only the anti-establishment; some 20 % only trust the 
establishment; and 15 % trust neither the establishment nor the anti-establishment. The 
remaining interviewees could not be classified, either for lack of figures or because of "don't know" 
answers (Fig. 1 0). 
In the comparison between the credibility of the "establishment" and the "anti-establishment", it 
is noticeable that more of the interviewees trust the anti-establishment than the establishment 
(59 % as against 55 %). 
The majority of the interviewees consider television reporting to be balanced. Only small groups 
of 12 % and 14 % respectively feel that television reports too negatively or too positively on 
nuclear energy, so that the Chernobyl events were overdramatized or played down (Fig. 11). In 
this respect, opponents of nuclear energy believe more often than the average interviewee that 
television is too positive in reporting on nuclear energy. This is analogously true of the supporters, 
who tend to fee1 that television reporting on nuclear energy is too negative. The corresponding 
correlation is "b = 0.29 and is significant at the 1-%-level. So there is a tendency for television 
reporting to be experienced as being opposed to one's one opinion. 
31 The index "confidence in establishment" was calculated as a mean value from the answer codes to the 
questions about the credibility of the Federal Government, the nuclear research centres and the industry 
(with "I" for "completely trustworthy" to "4" for "completely untrustworthy") and the index "confidence 
in anti-establishment" has a mean value from the codes of the Ecological Institute, citizens' action 
committees and journalists. To take account of the fact that the credibility of journalists has a some 
what lower factor than that of the other two institutions, the codes of the journalists were given a weight 
of 0.5 in calculating the mean value. Finally, the values of both indices were dichotomized on a value 
of 2. 5. 
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Fig. 11 Assessment of television reporting by interviewees according to balance 
and substantive accuracy 
Such a "hostile media phenomenon" is observed on other occasions (Vallone et.al., 1985) and 
contradicts the view that mass media information contrary to the recipient's opinions is perceived 
less likely - as might be expected in view of the theory of selective perception. Thus, notice is in 
fact taken of information that contradicts the individual's views, although it is neutralized by 
various immunization strategies, eg., by casting doubt on the credibility or competence of the 
source concerned or by simply not accepting the paradigm within which the information is relevant 
at all. 32 
Also striking is the high proportion of some 43 % of the interviewees who consider television 
reporting to be incorrect in part at least (Fig. 11). This evaluation expresses considerable 
detachment from the medium (in reporting the events during and after Chernobyl). The reason for 
this may be found in the contradictions experienced in the reporting. 
An exarnination of the relationship between perceived correctness of television reporting and po-
sitions on withdrawal from nuclear energy reveals a curvilinear relationship: both the supporters 
of more nuclear energy and the advocates of an accelerated withdrawal from nuclear energy are 
more critical in their assessment of the correctness of television reporting than those interviewees 
who are willing to tolerate the use of nuclear energy, i.e., who are neither definitely pro- nor 
anti-nuclear. 
This result can be interpreted if we assume that people with clearly defined positions follow the 
media reporting less from an interest in personal information (which would make a selection of 
information in conforrnity with their own opinion probable) than in view of the supposed effects 
on other individuals among whom they fear an impact or manipulation contrary to their own 
views. 
These results of a representative poll are largely in line with the experience of the in-depth inter-
views, in which journalists were hardly reproached with attempted manipulation but which tended 
32 An example of this last strategy can be found in one of our in-depth interviews in which an intelligent 
young woman, in reply to the question about the comprehensibility of information on Chernobyl , said: 
"No, not for me. But it doesn't have to be comprehensible in my case, though. I judge by feeling , and 
that's enough forme. And I find it's right that way." At another point in the same interview, the woman 
remarked that she could not talk very easily about Chernobyl to her husband, since "for me he was not 
hysterical enough about this business and not sensitive enough," although he, too, was a confirmed 
advocate of a withdrawal from nuclear energy. The paradigm of "rationality" within which information 
about technical or biological facts only makes any sense at all is explicitly rejected here in favour of the 
paradigm of "emotionality". 
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to challenge their competence. Thus, the deficits in the reporting on Chernobyl are, to most 
television viewers, not so much an "ideology" problern as a competence problem. 
3.5 The Injluence of Sociodemographic Variables 
In the last two sections reference was repeatedly made to the influence of sociodemographic va-
riables. The following section considers some of the particularly interesting points once again in 
context. 
Sex-specific differences in the perception and assessment of nuclear energy, such as have been 
observed again and again in empirical studies, can be shown in the present data as well: women 
are more critical of nuclear energy than men (Table 2). This correlation holds true when we check 
the educational background and is found in all age groups. 
Charles J. Brody, on the basis of a secondary analysis of two American surveys on nuclear energy 
in the years 1975 and 1976, comes to the conclusion that the main reason for this sex-specific 
difference in opinions is to be found in the greater stress laid by women on safety aspects. The 
likewise conceivable hypothesis, that the different assessments given by men and women are due 
to differences in the perception of economic advantages, is one that he rejects (Brody, 1984). 
However, his argumentation on the irrevelance of economic aspects to explain sex-specific 
differences is not conclusive so that this question must remain open for the time being.33 
One surprise is the result of only a slight statistical association between the presence of small 
children in the family and the perceived threat from environmental pollution in general and from 
the reactor disaster at Chernobyl in particular, as well as the corresponding consequences for 
nutrition and the withdrawal from nuclear energy (Table 2). Now, the presence of small children 
is strongly correlated with other sociodemographic variables like age, education and sex (more 
single mothers than fathers). As a result, corresponding relations may easily be modified by these 
intervening variables, so that a statistical control of possible intervening variables is necessary. 
Technically, this is done by using multivariate procedures and, in the present case of largely 
categorial data, by means of logistic regression. 34 The following dichotomized survey variables 
were used (successively) as dependent variables: 
e Nuclear energy risk compared with the USSR (less, greater or the same) 
e Perception of darnage to personal health (nofyes) 
e Change in personal eating habits (nofyes) 
e Position on use of nuclear energy (further usejaccelerated withdrawal) 
Four sociodemographic features were used as independent variables: 
e own children (nofyes) 
e sex (male/female) 
33 In bis argumentation, Brody proceeds in two steps. First of all, he proves that men and women differ 
in their perception of safety aspects, but not in their perception of economic aspects. He rightly assumes 
that this does not yet prove the relevance of such differences for the different attitudes to nuclear energy 
and, in a log-linear model containing the three variables "general nuclear attitude", "sex" and "perceived 
safety", shows that the relation between "sex" and "general nuclear attitude" is explained by the 
"perceived safety". In the process, however, he overlooks the fact that this is only true within the 
selected basic model and neglects to specify an extended model containing the "perceived economic 
advantages" as weiL Even if there are no sex-specific differences in the mean evaluation of the economic 
advantages and drawbacks of nuclear energy, the correlation between the perception of these advantages 
and drawbacks and attitudes to nuclear energy may nevertheless be subject to sex-specific explanation. 
34 For a precise description of the general linear model underlying this procedure, see, eg., Arminger 
(1983) and Baker/Nelder (1978). On the multivariate analysis of non- metric data in general, Küchler 
(1979) can be recommended. 
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I Men 
without children 
Nuclear energy risk 0.00 
compared with UdSSR 
Perception of darnage 0.00 
to personal health 
Change in personal 0.00 
diet 
Position on use of 0.00 
nuclear energy 
Parameter estlmates of a log~stlc model; all values - w1th 
a statistical control of age and education - are to be 
interpreted relative to the reference category of meu 
without children: positive values mean higher estimates of 
risks and more frequent consequences than in the reference 
group, while negative values indicate the contrary 
I Wor.Jen 
with children without childn:n with children 
-0.11 0.50 0.99 * 
-0.38 -0.28 0.28 * 
-0.07 0.52 1.04 * 
-0.59 * 0.40 0.53 
* Difference significant at 5-%-level 
Table 5 Influence of children on perception and assessment of the Chernobyl events 
e age (6 age groups) 
e education (6 ordinal categories) 
The object of the analysiswas to determine the relationship between sex and the presence of small 
children and the dependent variables, with a statistical control of age and education. For this 
purpose, model equations were formulated in such a way that they contained the main effects of 
age, education, children and sex, the interaction effects of age and education and of children and 
sex.3s The main and interaction effects of age and education are represented in the model only to 
obtain a statistical control of the effects of the variables children and sex with regard to the first 
two variables named, so that their content is not the subject of further interpretation in the present 
study. 
The parameter estimates of the model are astonishing (Table 5). Indeed, controlling for age and 
education does not alter the sex-specific difference in the perception and assessment 
of the events at Chemobyl that women rate the risk higher than men do, so that they change their 
eating habits more often and arealso more in favour of a withdrawal from nuclear energy. Only 
one single parameter value, viz. the assessment of the effects on health given by women without 
children, does not fit into the picture, although we have no ready explanation for this. 
However surprising are the results of the comparison between interviewees with and without small 
children. While the existence of small children has the expected effects among women, viz. that the 
consequences of Chemobyl are given a more serious assessment, the contrary is the case for men 
with small children. Men with small children tend to take a more casual view of the consequences 
of Chemobyl then men without small children. The existence of this converse correlation between 
the existence of children and the assessment of the consequences of Chemobyl among men and 
women explains why the overall figures revealed only a slight effect produced by the existence of 
children: the definite correlation between the existence of small children and the assessment of the 
consequences of Chemobyl among women is partly compensated by an altogether weaker 
correlation, the other way round, among men. These effects are more or less on the margin of 
statistical significance. On the other hand, the high consistency of these results between different 
variables suggest that it is unlikely that these facts have no substantive causes. 
35 As formulated in the GLIM statistical analysis program employed, (Baker/Nelder, 1978): 
AGE*EDUCATION + CHILDREN*SEX 
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Advocates of "stepping up" withdrawal from nuclear energy as a function 
of education, for younger and older interviewees 
The correlation between the position taken by the interviewees on the future use of nuclear energy 
and their educational background - taking a global view - is very slight (rb = 0.03, cf. Table 2). 
However, a closer Iook shows that there is a considerable divergence between younger and older 
interviewees (Fig. 12). 
Among younger interviewees (younger than 35 years) there is a definite positive relationship with 
education: the better the educational background, the more probable it is that the interviewee is 
in favour of a withdrawal from nuclear energy (rb =0.18). The perfect picture of a monotonic 
relationship is impaired merely by the group "senior secondary education without schoolleaving 
certificate", which act like the group "with university matriculation certificate" and by the 1owest 
educational group, which is rather more critical in its views on nuclear energy, among both the 
younger and the older members, than the interviewees "with apprenticeship". 
In the case of the group "senior secondary education without school leaving certificate", the 
younger interviewees are likely to be students still attending grammar school and not drop-outs 
as in the case of the older interviewees. lt is not implausible that these students will reply like the 
grammar school leavers. So the classification of these interviewees in a category between people 
"with apprenticeship" and interviewees "with intermediate secondary school certificate" is rather 
doubtful. On the other hand, there is no obvious explanation for the rise in mean rejection 
encountered in the lowest educational group. However, the difference between this and the next 
group is very small and not significant. 
There is no pronounced relationship ( rb = 0.02) between educational Ievels and the rejection of 
nuclear energy among older interviewees ( > 35) so that education as a predictor of attitudes to 
nuclear energy is only of importance in the case of younger interviewees. 
The differences between older and younger interviewees with regard to their position on nuclear 
energy is much more pronounced at higher than at lower educational Ievels. One possible 
explanation is that the interviewees with lower educationallevels and a correspondingly shorter 
period of school attendance are much more thoroughly socialized in class-specific generation-
spanning social networks than interviewees with a higher educational background and a Ionger 
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Nuclear energy Perception of Change in Position on 
risk compared darnage to per- personal use of nuclear 
with USSR sonal health diet energy 
General environ- 0.24 ** 0.25 ** 0.12 ** 0.26 ** 
mental sensitivity 
Nuclear energy risk 0.22 ** 0.09 ** 0.34 ** 
compared with UdSSR 
Perception of darnage 0.22 ** 0.27 ** 
to personal health 
Change in personal diet 0.21 ** 
Measure: Kendall's 'h ** significant at !-%-Ievel 
Table 6 Interrelationships of some substantive variables 
period of attending school, whose political socialization will have been deterrnined to a greater 
extent by school and university. lf we assurne the proposition that extensive changes have taken 
place there since the sixties both in the curricula and in the social clirnate of school and student 
networks, this might go sorne way to explain the great difference in assessing nuclear energy. 
3.6 Interdepencence of Substantive Variables 
As expected, the variables 
e General environrnental sensitivity 
e Nuclear energy risk cornpared with the USSR 
e Perception of darnage to personal health 
e Changes in personal eating habits 
e Position on use of nuclear energy 
are more or less strongly correlated (Table 6). The best predictor of advocacy of withdrawal frorn 
nuclear energy is the evaluation of the risk of an accident in West Germany sirnilar to that at 
Chemobyl. So it is not so rnuch the beliefthat the consequences of Chernobyl are not so serious 
after all as the view that German nuclear power stations are safer than Russian plants that rnake 
a large nurober of interviewees favour or at least tolerate the further use of nuclear energy. On top 
of this, we may have the argument that, if Germany goes alone in withdrawing frorn nuclear 
energy, this would bring little in the way of safety, in view of the extent of the risk and the 
proximity of rnany nuclear power stations to the German border, but would involve considerable 
economic drawbacks.36 
The "change in eating habits" correlates most strongly with the perception of darnage to personal 
health, which is indeed plausible. Those who do not believe in any grave threat to their health 
frorn the radiological irnpact of Chernobyl are less likely to change their eating habits. Still, the 
converse is also conceivable: those for whorn the change in eating habits is a nuisance or not 
possible, because they eat in the factory canteen, for exarnple, talk thernselves into believing that 
the health risks are not so great after all. 
36 This argumentation pattern occurred often in the accompanying in-depth interviews. 
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4 Interpretations and Political Implications 
4.1 Social and Psychological Consequences of Chernobyl 
The events at Chernobyl have very different effects on different people. Convinced advocates and 
opponents of nuclear energy are unlikely to have changed their minds. Opponents of nuclear 
energy feit confirmed in their views. They can pointout that they foresaw such an accident. They 
feel that withdrawal from nuclear energy is possible without serious economic consequences, or 
that the step should be taken even at the price of lower living standards. As alternatives to nuclear 
energy, they refer, first of all, to regenerative energy sources and energy saving, and, secondly, to 
coal, which should be used in power stations that are as environmentally safe as possible. 
The convinced advocates of nuclear energy, on the other hand, felt the head wind of public opinion 
and, although this prevented them from aggressively arguing their case37, they seldom changed 
their minds. A nurober of cognitive strategies are employed by this group to deprive the event of 
its relevance for their own opinion3s: 
e They point out that Russion nuclear power stations for various reasons (inter alia for reasons 
associated with the authoritarian political system) are much less safe than German power 
stations. 
e They stress that, if Germany were to go it alone in withdrawing from nuclear energy, this 
would entail hardly any gain in safety, but would involve considerable economic and 
competitive drawbacks. 
e They point to the energy needs that must be covered and for which nuclear energy is 
indispensable. 
e The risk to health from fallout following the Chernobyl accident is disputed. 
e Finally, they postulate a link between nuclear energy and "progress", summed up m a 
statement like: we can't go back to the Stone Age. 
The convinced advocates of nuclear energy, on the one hand, feel that exaggerated accounts were 
given in the West Germanmedia of the consequences of the reactor disaster, but are prepared, on 
the other hand, to accept a certain risk as the price for the advantages brought by nuclear energy. 
Of course, most of the population is not made up of convinced advocates or opponents of nuclear 
energy, but of people with an ambivalent attitude toward nuclear energy. The perceived risks 
associated with nuclear energy are contrasted with perceived economic advantages which people 
do not want to do without. This group is open to information on the risks involved in nuclear 
energy, such as became clear in the Chernobyl disaster, and employs no conciliatory strategies, as 
the convinced advocates of nuclear energy do, in order to play down the scale of the disaster. An 
increase in the perceived risk associated with nuclear energy, although the perceived utility remains 
the same, willlead to a worsening in the cost-benefit ratio for nuclear energy. This is reflected in 
the increase mentioned in the nurober of those in favour of withdrawing from nuclear energy. In 
37 On the interpretation of "public opinion" as a sanction norm for public communicative action, cf. 
Noelle-Neumann (1980, p. 91ff.) and Peters (1984, pp. 41-43). 
38 The analysis of the in-depth interviews now in progress will throw more light on these questions. 
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view of their inconsistent belief structure, on the other hand, this group is also open to a further 
revision of its attitude to nuclear energy. The extent to which this actually occurs, eg. as the events 
at Chernobyl recede into the past and the memory fades, will be shown by the scheduled repeats 
of the representative survey. 
The relative weight of the economic and the risk-related considerations associated with nuclear 
energy is dependent on a number of factors which, in their interaction, give rise to complex 
relationships between the position on nuclear energy and sociodemographic variables. These 
factors include: 
1. Socialization conditions during certain critical phases in early youth that depend on the 
structure of values of the time (Inglehart), on upbringing in the family and the type of 
education or vocational training. 
2. Phases within the life cycle associated, say, with the responsiblilty (in financial and health 
questions) for one's children. 
3. Nature of one's profession and position in the professional ruerarchy, involving, say, 
responsibility for the continuation and profit of a firm or activity like that of a teacher in 
charge of dependent persons 
4. Sex-specific roles, which can be more or less pronounced and may have an impact, eg., on the 
division of labour between man and woman inside the family (responsibility for earning a 
living, as against responsibility for the physical and psychological welfare of children). 
5. Loyalties to institutions like, eg., political parties, trade unions, churches, etc., which have 
themselves formulated and published more or less definite positions on nuclear energy for the 
orientation of their members. 
These five fundamental factors, which probably go far to determine the perception and evaluation 
of the events at Chernobyl, correlate with sociodemographic variables like age, sex, education 
levels, existence of small children, etc., and, in this way, create the complex picture we have of 
non-monotonic relations and interaction effects in which it is difficult to identify causal factors. 
4.2 The Polarization of Science 
The fact that only 54 % of the population trusted the information from national nuclear research 
centres after Chernobyl is only at first sight surprising. According to a well-known dieturn of Karl 
Marx, "being" determines "consciousness". So organizations like the nuclear research centres which 
owe their foundation and continued existence to developments in nuclear energy are always open 
to suspicion that their Statements on nuclear energy reflect not simply the truth of scientific effort 
but also tactical considerations to safeguard their own survival. This was no problern as long as 
nuclear energy was widely accepted or while Opposition was confined to a small radical group. 
As our study shows, the credibility problern for nuclear research has now affected wide sections 
of the population. "He who pays the piper, calls the tune" is one of the heuristics used by people 
to describe the credibility issue. 
So-called "alternative" scientific facilities like the Öko-Institut {Ecological Institute) in Freiburg 
or the Institute for Energy and Environment (IFEU) in Heidelberg ha~e evolved in the minds of 
the public into a Counterbalance to the "established " research centres, so that they have virtually 
the same status and their statements enjoy hardly any less credibility than those of the nuclear 
research centres. This development is not to be explained by an inability on the part of the public 
to differentiate, so that people simply lump together anybody and everybody who give themselves 
a scientific veneer by adopting a title or an institutional name, since the credibility of nuclear 
research facilities is challenged in particular by people with good educational backgrounds. Even 
those citizens who consider the Statements of "alternative" scientists to be exaggerated are in favour 
of the existence of such facilities. Above all, the role of such alternative institutes as a "warning 
system" has now gained wide acceptance. 
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The polarization of science in an "established" and an "alternative" wing raises questions as to the 
functioning of the scientific system, whose overriding criterion should be that of "truth" and not 
that of "political impact" (Luhmann, 1986, p. 150ff.). The present survey does not produce any 
direct proposals for action to deal with science's loss of credibility. What does become clear isthat 
simply ignoring this problern is, in the long run, dysfunctional both for science itself and for the 
potential contribution it can make towards solving societal problems. 
Established research facilities' strategy of ignoring so-called alternative research has not prevented 
such research being regarded as credible by a !arge section of the public and has not stopped such 
facilities receiving research contracts from even a CDU government.39 The fact that an "alterna-
tive" science is recognized by the public and by political institutions implicitly challenges the 
universalist claims of "established" science. 
There is no simple solution to this problem. The inroads made by politics in science as a 
consequence of the inroads made by science in politics (Peter Weingart) cannot be stopped. On the 
other hand, it is worth considering, in research areas of such relevance to politics as energy and 
environmental research, how we might institutionalize cooperation and dispute between scientists 
to ensure that the primary issue is not so much the political impact of scientific statements but their 
"truth". 
Steps in this direction are the Select Committees (Enquete-Kommissionen) of the German 
Bundestag set up in recent years to help create an "arena" for scientific controversies with a 
political dimension. The institutionalization of working groups dealing with clearly defined issues 
and crossing the borderline between the two scientific "camps", instead ofthe practice ofproducing 
"expert reports" and "alternative expert reports", might be a further strategy to diminish the 
polarization of science. Joint project groups at a working Ievel are much more efficient ways to 
submit scientific arguments in the case of differences of opinion than public hearings and panel 
discussions - the form that most disputes between "established" and "alternative" scientists take 
today. 
A further strategy for depolarizing the scientific Iandscape would involve stressing the pluralism 
of scientific positions within each camp. Much more problematical than the existence of divergent 
views among scientists, which is after all the rule rather than the exception, is the perceived 
congruence of the membership in certain scientific organizations and the stances adopted there, 
giving rise to stereotypes which do not reflect the variety of opinions within both the "established" 
and the "alternative" camps. 
Finally, ways might be found of relaxing the close association of certain scientific organizations 
(like the nuclear research centres) with industry, which dates back to the early days of nuclear 
energy. In view of this interlocking of interests - certainly over rather than underrated by the ge-
neral public- the nuclear research centres suffer from the industry's poor image. Statementsmade 
by scientists on, say, the advantages of nuclear energy are only credible to the public if it cannot 
be ruled out a priori that these scientists could also hold an opposite view, and would not have to 
reckon with sanctions for doing so. 
The present policy pursued by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology tends to aim at 
a contrary strategy, viz. even closer association between nationallarge-scale research facilities and 
industry, in order to step up the process of economic innovation. But such a policy ignores the 
repercussions of increasing industrial cooperation on science itself, which is facing ever greater Ie-
gitimation problems in its contacts with the general public, wherever controversial technologies 
have to be developed (which is often only appreciated after the event, as in the case of nuclear 
energy). 
A loss of image for certain sections of the scientific community can have grave consequences. The 
view that, as long as state finance is assured, science can be indifferent to public opinion, is very 
39 A recent example of this practice is the commissioning of an report from the Ecological Institute by the 
Federal Economics Ministry on withdrawal from nuclear energy. 
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dangerous. In the first place, the public financing of controversial research in a democracy is under 
pressure to provide justification and is, potentially at least, in jeopardy. Secondly, a bad image has 
disastraus consequences for the recruiting of a new generation of scientists. The inclination to take 
up certain activities is not hereditary, but evolves in the course of a socialization process in which 
many factors, like career opportunities (labour market), working conditions (self-determination), 
potential earnings, access to influence and power, and public recognition as weil, all play a roJe. 
The fact that scientists earn more money in industry is no accident, but some compensation for 
their having to go without many privileges enjoyed by academic scientists - with comparable 
qualifications - and for their lower esteem in the public eye. 
4.3 Grientation in a State of Uncertainty 
The results of the survey indicate great uncertainty with regard to the evaluation of the 
consequences and the precautionary measures to be taken. A majority of the interviewees seem to 
be unable, faced with the events at Chernobyl, to find a consistent and reliable orientation for their 
own actions. 
Of course, the reactor accident at Chernobyl does mean a massive disruption in the orientation 
system for everyday action. Certain aspects of daily life, taken for granted and seldom subject to 
scrutiny, like diet, personal health, the innocuousness of natural environment, combine to form the 
unchallenged basis of everyday activities. Only where this basis need not always be called in 
question can it produce any certainty for our daily activities. 
This background of everyday behaviour was challenged by Chernobyl. The now widespread 
knowledge of the danger that radioactivity poses to personal health and the knowledge of the 
release of radioactive substances during the reactor accident called for a reorientation in our 
activity and generated uncertainty and even fear, to start with. 
In this situation, the individual was largely dependent on the assessment of the situation given by 
third parties - by experts and by political and administrative agencies. However, in view of the 
highly contradictory interpretations of the situation given even at the scientific Ievel of reality, on 
which both citizens and politicians were ultimately dependent, it was not possible to offer any 
definite orientation for action here either. Thus, uncertainty can be regarded as an objectively ra-
tional and appropriate response to any situation that has a risk potential for the citizens which 
cannot be defined with absolute reliability. 
The situation became even more unmanageable for the individual, however, due to an information 
policy on the part of the political and administrative system which made some critics speak of 
Chernobyl as being primarily an "information disaster". 
Of course, the to and fro between offical anouncements to the effect that health risks could be 
ruled out for the Federal Republic of Germany and other relatively far-reaching recommendations 
for action, coupled with contradictions in the measured values and Iimits, or information supplied 
on the effects of very low radiation on health, etc, cannot be blamed on the political and admi-
nistrative system alone; as was said earlier, this has its roots in the expert's Ievel of perception. To 
this extent, uncertainty cannot be ruled out even by the governmental crisis management, unless 
there is a monopoly of information at one government agency ,(eg., the Department of the 
Environment), but that would offend against democratic norms, and would be difficult to 
implement anyhow, since, where there is a free press, there are always other sources in addition 
to the government that are able to provide what may be contrary information. 
Nevertheless, going beyond this state of information, which the political and administrative system 
cannot remedy, the state's crisis management made its own contribution toward unnerving the 
population, since the government obviously did not succeed in creating an adequate Ievel of 
confidence about its ability to act amongst the public. Although the survey results show that, of 
all the institutions presented for an evaluation, the Federal Government was awarded the most 
points for credibility, we are stillieft with some 40 % of the interviewees who feel that the infor-
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mation published by the Federal Government following the disaster at Chernobyl was 
untrustworthy, either wholly or in part. For this group of interviewees, at least, the feeling of 
uncertainty produced by the reactor accident was not compensated by confidence in the reliability 
and competence of the state's crisis management. Even for a !arge number of the citizens who 
themselves said that they had substantial confidence in the information supplied by the Federal 
Government after Chernobyl, this evidently reflects only one aspect of the truth. Otherwise, it 
would be hard to explain why such a !arge proportion placea their confidence not only in the 
established, but in the non-established institutions as weiL 
Political crisis management can draw its Iegitimation mainly from the principle of providing 
"collective care", which in the case of Chernobyl implies steps to minimize the risk to the health 
of the individual citizen. In addition, crisis management, like any acts taken by the state, must 
satisfy the principle of "transparency" in order to enable a democratic control of the decision-
making process. After Chernobyl, therefore, citizens should be able to expect government agencies 
to give a full account of the information underlying the decision-taking process. In this respect, 
at least part of the populationwas disappointed. 
Moreover, it must be assumed that the confidence of the general public in the political systemwas 
already strained by the very fact that a "super-MCA" seemed to "refute" the information policy 
pursued until then by government agencies, which- underpinned by probabilistic risk studies- had 
always disrnissed disasters on the Chernobyl scale as merely hypothetical. In the controversy 
conducted in society prior to the reactor accident at Chernobyl on the risks involved in nuclear 
energy, the unbiased observer might weil have been given the impression that an accident like that 
at Chernobyl was a virtual impossiblity. Certainly with one eye on the general acceptance of 
nuclear energy, there was simply no discussion of the fact that the high safety standards applicable 
to nuclear power stations in the Federal Republic, on which the risk studies were based justifying 
the use of nuclear energy, were not satisfied by many foreign nuclear power stations, and that a 
reactor accident occurring outside West Germany might have an impact on the Federal Republic 
as well. 
The lack of differentiation in statements on the safety of nuclear power stations, seen in the 
practice of generalizing the results of studies devoted to specific nuclear power stations and 
extending them by an improper and uncontradicted process of popularization to apply to the 
safety of nuclear energy as a whole, was now held against nuclear energy as such after the 
catastrophe at Chernobyl. The public reversed the process and inferred the danger of nuclear 
energy as such from the proved danger of one specific reactor type. 
A "measure to create confidence" following Chernobyl would have to have involved an informa-
tion policy unreservedly oriented to the principle of "transparency" and publishing even 
contradictory scientific reports on the implications to be expected for the Federal Republic, while 
describing these contradictions as being incapable of solution at the Ievel of political crisis mana-
gement. Utterances like that of the Minister for the Interior Zimmermann, who claimed, as soon 
as the accident became known and even before detailed information was available, that there was 
no risk at all for the population of the Federal Republic, could not fail to arouse the citizen's 
suspicion that this crisis management was aimed less at the goal of collective care than at the goal 
of reassuring the population, so that the policy was being used less to inform the public than as a 
palliative.40 
The individual citizen's need to find some orientation in his state of uncertainty, caused by the 
contradictory information at his disposal and the lack of subjectively trustworthy sources of in-
formation, made it seem plausible for the citizen to employ information-aggregating heuristic 
mechanisms derived from everyday experience and used as interpretative patterns controlling his 
own information process, which he now applied to an involved and unfamiliar situation. Thein-
depth interviews revealed three different heuristic mechanisms of information aggregation and 
evaluation, which can be formulated as follows: 
40 Comparable, say, with the "information policy" of the pharmacist mentioned in the footnote no. 42. 
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1. "We're only getting the tip of the iceberg. The actual situation is sure to be much worse" 
2. "The whole thing is being exaggerated. There is hardly any real risk." 
3. "Some say this, and some say that. The truth is bound tobe somewhere in the middle". 
Unfortunately, the present surveys do not enable us to quantify the extent to which these three 
mechanisms played a role in assessing information. The most frequent position is likely to have 
been the third, however, i.e., a sort of weighted mean value was formed, with the weight probably 
depending on the relative credibility of the source of information and the risk orientation of the 
person concerned. 
4.4 Efficacy of Regulation Styles 
Even though we can assume that the primary goal of crisis management in the Federal Republic 
was a reduction in the direct consequences for the population's health, account must be taken of 
the fact that the political institutions concerned with regulation were confronted with various 
conflicting goals which, depending on the political position held, made it politically opportune to 
overdramatize or play down the consequences of Chernobyl: 
e The information and the action recommended influence the fear feit by the population and, 
hence public opinion regarding nuclear energy. In this way, the pressure of public opinion 
might give rise to a modification of energy policy. Those institutions with a positive view of 
nuclear energy will then tend to play down the implications, whereas those who are opposed 
to nuclear energy have an interest in dramatizing the impact. 
e Those institutions involved in informing the public on the events in Chernobyl will make 
attempts to present themselves as particularly competent and aware of their responsibilities 
in tackling the consequences, which will tend to mean recommending particularly 
thoroughgoing measures. 
e The more far-reaching the recommended measures are, the more serious will their economic 
side effects be (eg., on account of not selling food declared to be unfit for human 
consumption). Faced with potential claims for damages, those government agencies from 
whose budget any claims for damages would have tobe satisfied will be particularly restrictive 
in adopting recommendations which may involve financiallosses. 
In addition to the primary goal of protecting the population against radiological contamination, 
the above considerations will influence the information and other policies of the regulating insti-
tutions. The population is also aware of this. That is why any regulatory policy must deal with the 
suspicion of its being dependent on particular interests if the credibility of the regulating agencies 
is to be maintained and if voluntary measures are to be followed. 
One basic problern that seriously impedes a regulatory policy is the plurality of 
1. Risk orientations (degree of risk aversion) and 
2. Information needs and the ability to process information 
in the population. In fact, a different information policy would be necessary for different 
population groups. While mere recommendations are sufficient and comprehensible to one group, 
and any additional information would only tend to add to the confusion and jeopardize the 
recommendations, completely different information needs are encountered in groups with a better 
educational background and among people who feel particularly affected. In such cases, there is 
a desire to form one's own picture of the radiological contamination and - since inferences and 
recommendations always contain a subjective element, after all - to draw one's own conclusions 
from this information and at least appreciate how these recommendations came into being. In this 
group, the publication of recommendations without appropriate background information would 
immediately arouse the suspicion that the situation is being played down. 
In threatening events like Chernobyl, therefore, the government's information policy always 
represents a balancing act between the abysses of perplexity and confusion in the population, on 
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the one hand, and the loss of credibility, on the other. The more the information from state 
agencies is regimented, coordinated and centralized, the less will be the contradictions in the 
government's information, but the greater will be the distrust of the population, who may feel that 
relevant information is being concealed. Since government authorities, as the present study has 
shown, do not have a monopoly in credibility, a reduction in the contradictions of information 
supplied by the state would hardly diminish the confusion f-or the citizen, and suspicions about 
public information policy might even increase. 
The Federal Government's idea that information for the public should in future be centralized, 
as is envisaged in the Radiation Protection Precautions Act passed in January 1987, tackles only 
one source of uncertainty: the contradiction in information, while on the other hand encouraging 
misgivings about this source of information and undermining its credibility. Credibility in the face 
of an event like Chernobyl will only be maintained if everything is avoided that might look like 
suppressing or withholding information - even at the price of inconsistencies in the information 
supplied. 
The experience from the in-depth surveys is that many citizens are definitely in a position to cope 
with inconsistencies since they have to do this every day anyhow in a democracy with a free press. 
Viewed from this angle, the planned measure to centralize information must be regarded as highly 
questionable.4' 
The reasons just given make it clear that there can be no perfect information policy. In selecting 
the relatively "optimum" information policy we must consider the following aspects: 
e Transparancy and frankness (no concealing of even apparently menacing facts) 
e No hasty "a priori" judgements that have to be revised at a later date. 
e Discussion of the causes of differing judgements and existing uncertainty. 
e Recommendation of a graduated range of precautionary measures, to be followed to a greater 
or lesser degree, depending on individual needs.42 
The striking dependence of changes in nutritional patterns on educational background, as 
described earlier, makes it clear that a regulatory policy based primarily on voluntary 
recommendations gives rise to considerable class-specific inequalities in the spread of the risk in 
the population. The available data should not be naively interpreted as a measure of actual 
changes in diet but as a cognitive stance, as a willingness to take such steps. There may be 
numerous hurdles between the decision and its implementation, starting with the non-availability 
of alternatives (powdered milk, for example, was sold out in many places) up to time pressures 
which can vitiate good intentions when it comes to shopping. Many of the interviewees will have 
been induced by public opinion to make a verbal starement asserting a change in nutritional 
patterns, but will in reality have retained their old eating habits, either from complacency or from 
the Iack of a subjective feeling of being threatened - and it is quite plausible to assume that a 
corresponding "climate of opinion" will be perceived with greater intensity the higher up the 
educational scale we go. On the other hand, many of the interviewees who stated that they retained 
their old diet will in fact have been compelled to change their nutritional patterns owing to the 
41 The second survey series provides for a question on this complex, dealing with the preferences of the 
population with regard to a pluralist but contradictory, against a central information policy. 
42 Various studies examining how stress is dealt with make it clear that the experience of helpnessless is 
one of the greatest stress factors. Such helplessness was mentioned by several interviewees in the in-
depth interviews; in most cases, this was linked with a feeling of resignation. Thus, the indication of the 
possibility for action may have the effect of relieving tension and can reduce the stress Ievel. A 
pharmacist, asked on the behaviour of his customers, said that he had sold his customers an iodine 
preparation when requested. It contained iodine in such small quantities that it could have no harmful 
side-effects - although it would have no radioactive protection effects either. He justified this action by 
mentioning the "psychological impact" on the customers. This does of course raise considerable ethical 
problems as to how far it is justifiable to use false arguments and lull people into a feeling of (perhaps 
justifiable) security. 
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shortage of fresh milk, outdoor salad and so on in many retail stores - in many cases, without their 
being aware of the change. 
Nevertheless, should such cases arise in future and a decision have to be taken between "voluntary" 
nutrition at recommendations and govemmental measures, eg., confiscating or prohibiting the sale 
of contaminated food, it must be bome in mind that the less sweeping measures will not be heeded 
by wide sections of the community, so that considerable class-specific disparities will arise. The 
present study shows that this is true not just of the population as a whole but of specific risk 
groups like small children. 
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5 Summary and Further Outlook 
A representative survey of just under 2,000 citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany some 
seven months after the dramatic events at the Russian nuclear power station of Chernobyl 
demonstrates that the incident has left considerable sections of the population with a feeling of 
uncertainty as to the effects on their health. Surprisingly, about one half of the interviewees stated 
that they had altered either their own or their children's diets following the event. The changes 
actually noted are closely connected with the educational background of the interviewees, this 
probably being due, on the one hand, to the fact that (mainly in the group up to age 35) educated 
people tend in general to be more critical about nuclear energy than the less educated and, on the 
other hand, to the circumstance that the translation of opinions and attitudes into practical 
decisions and actionwill presumably be more rapid and systematic among people with a higher 
education. 
Some 40 % of the interviewees were shown by the poll to be in favour of an accelerated 
withdrawal from nuclear energy, i.e., by shutting down existing nuclear power stations and not 
only by stopping the construction of new reactors. Although a corresponding question had not 
been asked before the reactor accident, so that a genuine before-and-after comparison is not 
possible, it is likely that the Chernobyl accident has greatly increased the ranks of anti-nuclear 
groups. Interestingly enough, it is not the youngest interviewees who are most opposed to nuclear 
energy, but the group of 25 to 30 year-olds. 
The perception and evaluation of the events at Chernobyl is interindividually dependent on a very 
highly differentiated function involving generation, phase of life and situation as well as sex role, 
which gives rise to a very complex system of interrelationships between the assessment of the events 
and sociodemographic variables. 
As for the confidence placed in the institutions which provided the public with information 
following the accident at Chernobyl, there are two surprises. First of all, the confidence in 
"established" institutions like the Federal Government, nuclear research centres and the nuclear 
industry is hardly any greater than the confidence placed in institutions like the Ecological Insti-
tute, citizens' action committees and journalists opposed to the establishment. Secondly - and 
against all expectations - there is hardly any negative correlation between confidence in the 
"establishment" and confidence in the "anti-establishment". Approximately one quarter of the 
population more or less trust both camps; some 15 % trust neither. The single institution enjoying 
the highest credibility is the Federal Government; that enjoying the least credibility by far is the 
nuclear industry. 
Proceeding from some striking results of these surveys, there was a discussion of how the political 
implications of the observed response of society to the Chernobyl events might affect science policy 
and the design of a regulatory and information policy in situations like that after Chernobyl. 
This makes it clear that if the credibility of the governmental information policy is to be 
maintained, it is necessary to identify the sources of uncertainty and contradiction. In a muddle 
of information which is experienced by everybody and which cannot be avoided by any 
government in a pluralist society, streamlined information presented with dogmatic claims as to 
its truth will hardly become an anchor for orientation and will tend to arouse misgivings about the 
reliability of information supplied by the government. 
5 Summary and Further Outlook 37 
The present represensative opinion poll leaves some important questions as to the perception and 
evaluation of events at Chernobyl unanswered, and many new questions are raised by the results. 
A follow-up of the representative surveys, and the analysis of the in-depth interviews already 
carried out, will provide further insights into the response of the population. 
The area of institutional response has been largely ignored so far in our studies. Tothis extent, the 
present report is no more than an interim report as part of a comprehensive project to analyze the 
reactions of society to the events at Chernobyl. Further project stages will deal with the roles of 
scientific bodies, governmental institutions, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political groups 
in the political response to the reactor disaster. Also envisaged is an examination of the function 
of the mass media in transferring the information on the reactor accident in the Soviet Union and 
its impact on the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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Appendix: Questions and Distribution of Answers 
Appendix 41 
Question 1: General environmental sensitivity 
Much is said and written today about envionmental pollution and 
its effects on our health. 
I'll read out a few opinions. Tell me 
whether you agree with these opinions or not. 
Read the statements aloud 
Present-day Jife expectancy, i.e., the fact that people now live 
Ionger than they used to do, shows that pollution has no serious 
impact on health 
Although pollution does involve a risk to health, this can be 
restricted by taking proper action 
Illnesses caused by pollution represent one of the gravest 
threats today, and medicine is hardly able to protect us 
Question 2: Position on use of nuclear energy 
Different views can be held on the use of nuclear energy to 
generate electricity. Using the following Iist, tell me which 
opinion you would agree with. 
Present Iist G2 
Only one anwer possible 
We should use as much nuclear energy as possible and build 
further nuclear power stations if necessary 
We should maintain the present Ievel of using nuclear energy and 
only build new nuclear power stations if older plants are shut down 
We should use nuclear power stations already in operation or under 
construction until the end of their Jives, but not build any new 
plants 
We should shut down our nuclear power stations in the course of the next 
few years and dispense entirely with the use of nuclear energy 
We should shut down all our nuclear power stations at once 
Question 3: Presumable cause of the reactor disaster 
What in your opinion was the chief cause of the reactor disaster 
at Chemobyl: 
• Human error 
• or technical failure 
• or did both play a roJe? 
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human error 
technical failure 
both played a roJe 
don't know 
agree 
% 
19.3 
72.1 
72.1 
disagree ~ 
% % 
80.7 100.0 
27.9 100.0 
27.9 100.0 
N 
1,954 
1.955 
1.950 
7.2 
21.4 
31.2 
30.9 
9.3 
100.0 
(N = 1,953) 
% 
9.1 
8.9 
72.5 
9.4 
100.0 
(N= 1,963) 
Question 4: Risk of nuclear energy compared with the USSR 
Opinions differ as to whether the nuclear power stations in the 
Federal Republic are safer that those in the Soviet Union. 
What is your view? Is the risk of a disaster in German nuclear power stations -
• much less, 
e rather less, 
• just as less 
• or higher than in Russian nuclear power stations? 
much less 
rather less 
just as high 
higher 
don't know 
Question 5: Presumable number of casualties in the Federal Republic 
The increases in radioactivity following the Chemobyl disaster may give rise to 
cancer and cause further casualties in the years to come. 
In your view how many people in all will die in the Federal Republic as a result 
of the Chemobyl accident? 
Present Iist G3 
nobody 
less than 10 
10 - 100 
100- 1,000 
1,000- 10,000 
10,000- 100,000 
over 100,000 
don't know 
Question 6: Presumable number of casualties in the USSR 
An how many in the Soviet Union? 
Present List G4 
less than 10 
10 - 100 
100- 1,000 
1,000- 10,000 
10,000- 100,000 
over 100,000 
don't know 
% 
27.5 
34.4 
26.9 
1.0 
10.1 
100.0 
(N = 1,963) 
% 
13.1 
5.1 
6.7 
11.3 
9.3 
4.3 
2.8 
47.4 
100.0 
(N= 1,953) 
% 
0.2 
3.4 
8.9 
19.2 
17.8 
14.4 
36.1 
100.0 
(N = 1,957) 
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Question 7: Changes in personal diet 
Did you change your diet after the reactor disaster at Chernobyl 
in order to minimize the radiactivity in your food? 
Question 8: Nature of change in diet 
Which of the following precautionary measures did you take? 
(only asked if question 7 was answered in the affirmative) 
Presen t lis t G 5 
Multiple responses possible 
yes 
no 
Because of Chernobyl, less salad and fresh vegetables eaten than before 
Because of Chernobyl, less fresh milk and fresh milk products than 
before 
Because of Chemobyl fewer mushrooms and less game than before 
Other precautionary measures 
Question 9: Perception of darnage to personal health 
Do you feel that you personally have suiTered or will suffer injury to 
your health owing to the extra radioactivity? 
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yes 
no 
don't know 
44.9 
55.1 
100.0 
(N = 1.965) 
% 
93.7 
65.0 
65.2 
2X.O 
(N = 882) 
15.1 
45.6 
39.2 
100.0 
(N = 1,95X) 
Question 10: Own children under age 6 
Have you any chi1dren of your own under the age of 6 1iving in your 
househo1d? 
Question 11: Changes in childrens' diet 
yes 
no 
Have you changed the diet of this chi1d/these chi1dren on account of the radioactive 
contamination following the Chernoby1 disaster? 
(only asked if question 10 was answered in the affirmative) 
Question 12: Playing in the open 
yes 
no 
Did you allow yor child/children to play less in the open because of the 
Chernobyl accident? 
(only asked if question 10 was answered in the affirmative) 
yes 
no 
Question 13: Perception of darnage to childrens' health 
Do you feel that your child's health has been impaired by the extra radioactivity? 
(only asked if question 10 was answered with in the affirmative) 
yes 
no 
don't know 
% 
11.7 
88.3 
100.0 
(N= 1,965) 
% 
53.6 
46.4 
100.0 
(N = 215) 
% 
49.2 
50.8 
100.0 
(N=213) 
% 
17.2 
43.5 
39.2 
100.0 
(N=215) 
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Question 14: Credibility of information 
I will read you a Iist of institutions that published information 
on the facts of the Chemobyl disaster and issued recommendations 
for precautionary measures. Using this scale, teil me how reliable 
do you think the information provided by the various institutions was. 
Present Scale I 
Read out names 
Only one response possible 
completely partly 
reliable reliable 
% % 
The Federal Government 8.7 50.3 
The Opposition 3.5 48.8 
National nuclear research centers 12.6 41.4 
The Ecological Institute associated 8.6 42.8 
with the Greens 
Nuclear Energy Industry 4.8 29.4 
Citizens' Action Committees against 9.5 42.6 
nuclear energy 
Journalists 3.7 46.2 
Question 15: Balance in television reporting 
Television reported in detail on Chemobyl. 
What do you think: was the television reporting -
• largely balanced, 
• too negative as regards nuclear energy, 
• too positive as regards nuclear energy 
• or can't say? 
partly un-completely 
reliable unreliable 
% % 
24.4 11.7 
31.6 7.1 
23.9 10.5 
22.4 10.8 
28.3 24.9 
24.1 10.4 
30.2 8.7 
largely balanced 
don't 
know 
% 
5.0 
9.1 
11.5 
15.3 
12.6 
13.3 
11.2 
too negative as regards nuclear energy 
too positive as regards nuclear energy 
can't say 
Question 16: Factual accuracy of television reporting 
Do you feel that television reporting was in the main factually correct, 
or do you feel that incorrect information was often broad cast? 
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in the main factually correct 
partly incorrect 
don't know 
~ 
% 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
N 
1,961 
1,953 
1,955 
1,954 
1,957 
1,948 
1,957 
% 
42.5 
13.5 
12.2 
31.7 
100.0 
(N= 1,963) 
% 
35.4 
41.3 
23.4 
100.0 
(N= 1,963) 

